



National Coordination Mechanism (NCM) – Actions Minute		Australian Government Lead Agency: DITRDSCSA
Sector Lead Agency:	Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sports and the Arts (DITRDSCSA)	
Active National Plan:	Nil	
NCM – National Telstra Outage – Mtg 1		
Date:	Wednesday 8 July 2026	
Chair/Co-chair:	Katarina Carroll, Deputy Coordinator General, Emergency Management and Response Group, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)	
Co-chair:	Sarah Vandenbroek, A/g Deputy Secretary, Communications, Media and Sports, DITRDSCSA	
NCM summary:	• The NCM was convened in response to a Telstra outage affecting infrastructure and services across Australia. The NCM purpose was to gain shared situational awareness, understand the impacts across sectors and jurisdictions, and assess any consequences requiring coordination. • DITRDSCSA update - o Minister Wells and Minister McBain are receiving regular updates and issued a joint statement concurrent to the NCM about the outage. - o DITRDSCSA has activated all relevant Triple Zero custodian roles, and acknowledged stakeholder efforts to balance operational responsibilities with keeping stakeholders informed. - o Telstra network restoration is progressing and services are gradually returning to normal, although one network node remains unresolved. Customers that continue to experience connectivity issues are advised to power cycle their devices, noting this may not work in all cases. - o SMS issues are still under investigation - o Most Triple Zero welfare check referrals have been sent to emergency service organisations, with only a few additional cases expected.	

- **Telstra update**

- o Telstra's mobile network relies on network time protocol servers to keep systems synchronised.
- o The outage was not a security incident, but a network timing and certificate issue caused by a network time protocol server reverting to a 2006 date/time setting.
 - The incorrect time was passed through to parts of the mobile network.
 - When customers tried to make calls, the network checked with Telstra's billing/online charging system to confirm whether the customer was allowed to make the call, however because the network time and charging system information did not match, the system rejected some calls.
 - The issue gradually worsened as the incorrect timing information flowed through more systems and mobile network nodes.
- o Telstra isolated the faulty time server and reset affected mobile network nodes back to the correct time. Most services then recovered, with 5G and 4G data services mostly operating successfully, although some 4G customers may still have voice-call issues and if so, they should power cycle their phones.
- o Telstra checked its base stations and confirmed there were no base station failures. It found the issue was linked to customer network registration failures, caused by the billing component. Because affected customers could not register on the network, they could not make normal calls.
- o Triple Zero calls are expected to be largely unaffected because emergency calls do not rely on normal billing or customer account checks.
- o Telstra said any dropped Triple Zero call is traced and followed up with a welfare check. Telstra noted that of the calls being investigated, about half appeared to be people testing Triple Zero and then hanging up. Telstra is checking each case across its own and other networks, and at this point has not found evidence that anyone was unable to make a Triple Zero call because of the outage.
- o Triple Zero calls connect because emergency calling is handled by the handset's ability to access another available mobile network, rather than relying solely on the customer's normal carrier network authentication. Any affected customers would still be able to access Telstra's network or the strongest available network in the area.
- o If a phone cannot authenticate on its usual network, it will search for and connect to the nearest or strongest available network for emergency calling. Because Telstra's base stations were still operating and had not been switched off, affected phones could access Telstra's network, or potentially another carrier's stronger network in rural areas. This means the authentication issue should not prevent Triple Zero access. Other carriers, such as TPG, may have seen extra emergency call activity as a result.

	- o The issue was limited to mobile network time protocol systems, which may have had downstream impacts on mobile-related wholesale services only. Telstra advised that no other parts of the network should have been affected and asked that any separate or parallel issues be passed on promptly. - o Telstra advised it would lead public messaging regarding the outage and that stakeholders could expect further information to follow. • DITRDCSA – Triple Zero Division update - o The incident is being treated as a network outage, not a Triple Zero outage, because the Triple Zero platform operated by Telstra for the Commonwealth runs separately to the broader Telstra network and had continued working. - o Emergency calls were still able to access available networks, with Telstra, Optus and TPG confirming this was functioning. - o Dropped Triple Zero calls were being tracked and assessed to determine whether they were genuine dropped calls requiring welfare checks, or accidental/test calls. An increase in dropped calls may have been due to people testing the network, medical devices automatically calling Triple Zero, or callers hanging up because camp-on calls may take longer to connect and may not provide a normal dial tone. • Telecommunications sector update - o Impacts across critical infrastructure sectors were generally limited and largely managed through contingency plans. - o Optus reported that its network remained stable and operational during the incident. The main impact observed was Optus customers having difficulty contacting Telstra customers. Optus continues to actively monitor the situation, stay engaged with the incident response, and offer support as needed until the event was resolved. - o TPG service is operating well, although they observed an increase in “camp on” calls. TPG is in discussion with Telstra and Optus about network contingencies and ensuring continuation of services. - o NBN did not observe any impacts to its service. • Healthcare and Medical sector update - o Some operational issues with network connectivity across resources, and activations of medical alarms, resulted in a high volume of default calls to Triple Zero for welfare checks and the like. All are essentially resolved now. • Land Transport sector - o Australian Rail Track Corporation said the national rail network remained at a standstill due to the 4G issue. Operations could not resume until Telstra confirmed the network was reliable, particularly because emergency call capability could
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	not yet be guaranteed. Early intervention to resolve the issue is required due to the criticality of the rail service for the operation of supply chain. - o Other than the rail sector which has service impacts due to the outage, road, maritime and air services sectors have no service disruptions reported. Qantas Group activated its business continuity plan (BCP). • Energy sector update - o Advised that there were no material impacts to electricity or gas services, although the outage disrupted communications with some remotely monitored critical sites and affected some operations. - o Continuity arrangements were activated, recovery is underway, and the network remains safe. • Food and Grocery sector update - o Coles reported there are no significant impacts, and all stores are working as usual. • Water and Sewerage sector update - o Key impacts were observed across operational technology equipment with loss of visibility of critical infrastructure, but this was low risk as assets continued to operate in isolation. - o Key business continuity plans were enacted which included dual network coverage transitions put into place. There were no known direct impacts to water or wastewater services. • Payments sector update - o No outages were seen in core domestic payment systems (EFTPOS, BPAY and NPP) and any issues experience with terminals was likely to be local network issues. • Updates by jurisdictions - o Most jurisdictions reported either low or manageable impacts, with traffic signal disruptions being one of the more commonly reported consequences. - o NSW – experienced multiple impacts across multiple agencies, with some agencies operating under BCPs. The call-taking agencies (police for ambulance) have been working closely with the State Emergency Management Committee. - o VIC – carried out 20 welfare checks linked to dropped emergency calls, with outcomes not yet available. There were some impacts to regional emergency service communications where 4G is used as backup, along with rail disruption, traffic light signalling issues, CCTV monitoring impacts, Ports Victoria using UHF as a continuity measure, point-of-sale problems, and some government call centre contact issues. Most departments activated BCPs, but there were no
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	critical or significant impacts reported across health, energy, water, food and grocery, or public warning systems. There are no reported critical community consequences. - o WA – noted most critical services had either not been significantly affected by the outage or had activated BCPs. Engagement with critical services is still ongoing, but overall disruption is minimal. - o TAS – reported significant operational impacts across government services, including loss of connectivity, traffic signal issues, disruption to mobile-based multi-factor authentication, and SMS problems. - o ACT – ACT reported minor impacts, as Optus is its primary provider and the outage mainly affected Telstra-dependent remote connections. Some traffic lights switched to autonomous mode and non-critical CCTV systems were affected, but BCPs were sufficient, and no significant consequences were being tracked. - o SA – There are no significant issues reported at this stage. The team is continuing to work through matters with emergency groups. - o QLD and NT had no further updates.
Harm or potential harm	
Category:	Infrastructure - Communications
Subcategory:	Transport Sector
Other:	Supply Chain and other related services
Attendees: Australian Government, state and territory government, TISN sector leads, key industry leads	